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Unintentional Destruction: Torres v. Madrid,
in Defining a Fourth Amendment Seizure of
the Person as a Common Law Arrest, Turned
Terry v. Ohio into Collateral Damage
BY GEORGE M. DERY III*

Abstract
This article analyzes Torres v. Madrid, in which the Supreme Court
ruled an officer seized a person when he shot her, even though the suspect
temporarily eluded capture after the shooting. This work examines the
logical implications of Torres’s reasoning. Torres equated a Fourth
Amendment seizure of the person with a common law arrest and defined an
arrest to include an officer’s slightest touching of a person, even with only a
finger. This article asserts that the force of Torres’s logic has elevated the
Terry stop and frisk to a full arrest because Terry’s intrusion involves official
touching and control beyond Torres’s common law minimum. Since Terry
allowed officers to perform a stop and frisk on reasonable suspicion, a level
of certainty below the probable cause needed for an arrest, logical
consistency would require the Court to either disapprove Terry stops and
frisks based on reasonable suspicion or forgo the strict application of
common law to the Fourth Amendment. Finally, this article suggests that,
with the dramatic changes in policing and society occurring since the
common law era, true fealty to Fourth Amendment values requires that the
Court broaden its approach while respecting the precedent of the last fifty
years.
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I. Introduction
In Torres v. Madrid, the U.S. Supreme Court held that an officer seizes
a person when he shoots her, even if the person shot “temporarily eludes
capture after the shooting.”1 The justices who took part in the Torres’s
decision hotly contested the issue in the case. The dissent accused the Court
of expanding on dicta, violating canonical rules of interpretation, and
reengineering long-abandoned precedent.2 All justices considering the case,
however, agreed that the question of Fourth Amendment protection hinged
on the proper understanding of English common law cases dating as far back
as four centuries ago.3 The Countess of Rutland’s Case, which generated
particular disagreement between the majority and dissent, was decided by
the Star Chamber in 1605.4 The majority likened the arrest the serjeants-atmace made by touching Isabel Holcroft, Countess of Rutland, with a mace
to the officers’ seizure of Torres by shooting her.5 The dissent in Torres
deemed these “mere-touch” arrests to be a “farce.”6
The definition of seizure that the Court unearthed relied on the common
law definition of arrest as the “quintessential ‘seizure’ of the person under
our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.”7 The reasoning behind the Torres
decision equated a Fourth Amendment seizure with common law arrest,
which directly undermined the constitutional viability of the stop and frisk
recognized in Terry v. Ohio.8 A Terry stop and frisk, involving as it does the
thorough pat down of a person under the officer’s control,9 would certainly
fulfill, and even exceed, the “slightest application of force” occasioned by
the tap of a mace that amounts to a full arrest under the Torres definition of
a seizure of a person.10 However, since our nation’s founding, arrests have
required probable cause rather than the reasonable suspicion crafted in Terry
for a stop and frisk.11 Thus, Torres’s novel “slightest touch” arrest elevates

1. Torres v. Madrid, 141 S. Ct. 989, 993-94 (2021).
2. Torres, 141 S. Ct. at 1005, 1007, 1017, 1011 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
3. Id. at 997, 1013. Only eight justices decided the case because “Justice Barrett took no part
in the consideration or decision of this case.” Id. at 1003.
4. Id. (citing Countess of Rutland’s Case, 6 Co. Rep. 52b, 77 Eng. Rep. 332 (Star Chamber
1605)).
5. Id. at 997-98.
6. Id. at 1011.
7. Id. at 995.
8. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19, n. 16, 30 (1968).
9. Id. at 17, n. 13.
10. Torres, 141 S. Ct. at 996.
11. As noted by Justice Douglas in his dissenting opinion in Terry, “[O]fficers up to today
have been permitted to effect arrests or searches without warrants only when the facts within their
personal knowledge would satisfy the constitutional standard of probable cause. At the time of their
‘seizure’ without a warrant they must possess facts concerning the person arrested that would have
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a Terry stop and frisk to an arrest, which occurs countless times a day in our
nation without the legal backing of probable cause.12 If Terry went out on a
limb in justifying a stop and frisk on reasonable suspicion, Torres built the
saw to cut that limb off.
Given the danger that Torres poses to Terry, will the Court follow
Torres’s logic to its conclusion and end the Terry stop and frisk? True
adherence to the common law of our Founders might require such a drastic
measure. Or will the Court flinch at the originalist implications of its
reasoning and maintain Terry, a seminal case which has been recognized as
precedent for over half a century? This article considers these questions and
offers a measured solution that acknowledges the importance of the common
law while respecting the Court’s major precedent.

II. California v. Hodari D.’s Determination that an Arrest at
Common Law Was a Quintessential Fourth Amendment
Seizure of the Person Launched the Court on a Rigidly
Cramped Interpretation of the Constitution.
Torres v. Madrid was not the first case to define a Fourth Amendment
seizure of the person in terms of common law arrest. Thirty years earlier, in
California v. Hodari D., the Court consulted the common law definition of
arrest to determine when a seizure of a person occurred.13 In Hodari D.,
officers on patrol in Oakland, California saw a group of juveniles huddling
around a parked car.14 When the youths took flight upon seeing the police,
Officer Jerry Pertoso left his police car and pursued one of the juveniles,
Hodari D., on foot.15 Hodari D. did not actually see Officer Pertoso “until
the officer was almost upon him, whereupon he tossed away what appeared
to be a small rock.”16 Only a “moment later,” the officer tackled and
handcuffed Hodari D.17 Police found that the rock Hodari D. had discarded
was crack cocaine.18
These facts presented the Court with the issue of “whether, at the time
he dropped the drugs, Hodari D. had been ‘seized’ within the meaning of the

satisfied a magistrate that ‘probable cause’ was indeed present. The term ‘probable cause’ rings a
bell of certainty that is not sounded by phrases such as ‘reasonable suspicion.’” Terry, 392 U.S. at
37 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
12. Torres, 141 S. Ct. at 997.
13. California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 624 (1991).
14. Id. at 622.
15. Id. at 623.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 623.
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Fourth Amendment.”19 If Pertoso had seized Hodari D. merely by chasing
him, then that seizure, lacking sufficient justification, would taint the drugs
as fruit of an illegal seizure.20 If, instead, Pertoso had only seized Hodari D.
when he tackled him after the cocaine was discarded, then Hodari D. merely
abandoned the drugs.21 Hodari D.’s issue thus focused on whether the
officer’s pursuit amounted to a seizure by a “show of authority.” The Court
itself noted that its case did “not involve the application of any physical
force” because “Hodari was untouched by Officer Pertoso” at the time he
disposed of the cocaine.22 Despite the lack of physical contact, Hodari D.
began its analysis by first defining a Fourth Amendment seizure of the person
by “physical force” before considering “show of authority.”23
Hodari D. analyzed a Fourth Amendment seizure of a person through
force by focusing on the definition of an “arrest,” which it deemed “the
quintessential ‘seizure of the person’ under our Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence.”24 To be “quintessential,” according to Merriam Webster, is
to be “perfectly typical or representative of a particular kind of person or
thing.”25 In the Court’s hands, however, an arrest evolved from being a
typical example of a seizure to being the definition of all seizures, for Hodari
D. created its current boundaries of a seizure by reference to common law
arrest.26 First, the Court noted, “[t]o constitute an arrest … under our Fourth
19. Id.
20. Id. at 624.
21. Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 624.
22. Id. at 625.
23. Id. at 624. The Court acknowledged that its case was “removed” some steps away from
its physical force discussion because of the lack of any physical force being applied to Hodari D.
when he dispensed with the drugs, id. at 625. The dissent in Torres noted the contact or touch
discussion was, by, “any account, … Dicta,” Torres, 141 S. Ct. at 1005 (2021) (Gorsuch, J.,
dissenting).
24. Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 624.
25. Quintessential means the “most typical example or representative,” Quintessential,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/quintessential. In using the
“quintessentially a seizure” quotation, Hodari D. made a little go a long way. The Court had
retrieved the passage from Justice Powell’s concurrence in United States v. Watson. United States
v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 428 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring). The full quotation of Justice Powell
is, “[s]ince the Fourth Amendment speaks equally to both searches and seizures, and since an arrest,
the taking hold of one’s person, is quintessentially a seizure, it would seem that the constitutional
provision should impose the same limitations upon arrests that it does upon searches,” id. Here,
Justice Powell, despite accepting the Court’s holding in Watson that police need not obtain an arrest
warrant when arresting a person in a public place, was suggesting that logic would require a warrant
for an arrest since the Fourth Amendment requires a warrant for a search, which in the abstract, is
a less intrusive official invasion on the individual. Id. at 423-28. Thus, Justice Powell, in simply
noting that the Court places less restrictions on a seizure, even though it is a more intrusive
government action than a search, mentioned that an arrest is a kind of a seizure, id. Hodari D. then
employed this unremarkable assertion to make an arrest the definition of a Fourth Amendment
seizure of a person, Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 624, 626.
26. Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 624, 626.
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Amendment jurisprudence—the mere grasping or application of physical
force with lawful authority, whether or not it succeeded in subduing the
arrestee, was sufficient.”27 The Court then employed this definition of arrests
to all seizures by stating, “[t]he word ‘seizure’ readily bears the meaning of
a laying on of hands or application of physical force to restrain movement,
even when it is ultimately unsuccessful.”28 The Court clarified that “merely
touching” one who breaks free did not constitute “a continuing arrest during
the period of fugitivity.”29 Thus, according to Hodari D., to be seized under
the Fourth Amendment was to be arrested.30
The Court had committed to viewing a Fourth Amendment seizure of
the person through a common law lens even before it reached the actual issue
presented in the case—”whether, with respect to a show of authority as with
respect to application of physical force, a seizure occurs even though the
subject does not yield.”31 In answer to this second question, the Court held
that no seizure occurs with show of authority if the suspect refuses to “yield”
because, “[a]n arrest requires either physical force … or, where that is
absent, submission to the assertion of authority.”32 Hodari D.’s failure to
stop when chased did not trigger the Fourth Amendment because there
simply is no seizure when, despite an officer “yelling ‘Stop, in the name of
the law!’” the suspect “continues to flee.”33 The Court concluded, “since
Hodari did not comply with that injunction he was not seized until he was
tackled.”34
In defining a Fourth Amendment seizure of a person, whether by force
or by show of authority, Hodari D. harkened back to common law, which
limited a seizure to an arrest.35 Such a conclusion was a necessary result of
the Court’s approach because, at common law, an arrest was the only
recognized form of seizure. The lesser seizure of a stop and frisk would only

27. Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 624.
28. Id. at 626.
29. Id. at 625.
30. Id. at 624. By focusing on common law cases, Hodari D. necessarily limited itself to
arrests. The only seizure in existence at the time of common law was the arrest—Terry v. Ohio,
with its recognition of the lesser form of a seizure known as a “stop,” would only occur nearly two
centuries after the American Revolution. Terry, 392 U.S. at 16, 30. “Until Terry, the Supreme
Court’s cases suggested that the only seizure of the person by the Fourth Amendment was an
arrest.” CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: AN
ANALYSIS OF CASES AND CONCEPTS 217 (Foundation Press, 7th ed. 2020).
31. Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 626.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 629.
35. Hodari D. explained, “We have consulted the common-law to explain the meaning of
seizure…,” id. at 626, n. 2. Also please note the sentence referring to footnote 24, which states,
“…”arrest,” which it deemed “the quintessential ‘seizure of the person…’”
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be formally recognized by the Court in Terry v. Ohio.36 The full
consequences of restricting Fourth Amendment seizures of a person to
common law rules would not be fully realized until Torres v. Madrid.

III. Torres v. Madrid
A. Facts

On July 15, 2014, Officers Janice Madrid and Richard Williamson of
the New Mexico State Police force went to an apartment complex in
Albuquerque attempting to execute an arrest warrant for a woman accused,
among other crimes, of drug trafficking and murder. 37 When the officers
observed Roxanne Torres standing near a Toyota FJ Cruiser, they
determined that she was not the “target of the warrant.”38 However, Torres,
either suffering methamphetamine withdrawal or actively “tripping out bad”
on the drug, and also being the subject of another arrest warrant, got into the
vehicle’s driver’s seat as the officers approached.39 When the officers tried
to speak with Torres, going so far as to attempt to open her car door, “she hit
the gas to escape them.”40 Despite the officers’ “tactical vests marked with
police identification,” Torres believed they were armed carjackers.41 While
Torres claimed that neither Madrid nor Williamson stood in the path of her
car,42 the officers feared the “oncoming car was about to hit them.”43 Both
officers responded to Torres’s flight by firing “13 shots at Torres, striking
her twice in the back and temporarily paralyzing her left arm.”44 “Steering
with her right arm, Torres accelerated through the fusillade of bullets, exited
the apartment complex,” and drove until she stopped to ask a bystander to
report an attempted carjacking.45 Torres then stole a Kia Soul idling nearby
and drove 75 miles to Grants, New Mexico.46 The hospital in Grants airlifted
Torres back to a hospital in Albuquerque, where she was arrested.47

36. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S., 1, 30 (1968). “Until Terry, the Supreme Court’s cases suggested
that the only seizure of the person by the Fourth Amendment was an arrest,” WHITEBREAD, supra
note 30.
37. Torres, 141 S. Ct. at 994.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 989, 994, 1003 (J., Gorsuch, dissenting).
40. Id. at 1003 (J., Gorsuch, dissenting).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Torres, 141 S. Ct. at 1003.
44. Id. at 989, 994.
45. Id.
46. Torres, 141 S. Ct. at 989, 994.
47. Id.
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Torres pleaded no contest to “aggravated fleeing from a law
enforcement officer, assault on a peace officer, and unlawfully taking a
motor vehicle.”48 Afterwards, Torres sued Officers Madrid and Williamson
under Section 42 U.S.C. 1983 for “the deprivation of constitutional rights by
persons acting under color of state law.”49 Torres argued that the officers
used excessive force when seizing her person under the Fourth
Amendment.50
B. The Court’s Opinion

The Torres Court, in an opinion delivered by Chief Justice Roberts,
framed the issue as “whether a seizure occurs when an officer shoots
someone who temporarily eludes capture after the shooting.”51 The Court
held, “the application of physical force to the body of a person with intent to
restrain is a seizure even if the person does not submit and is not subdued.”52
Torres reached this conclusion in stages. The Court began its analysis by
speaking of a Fourth Amendment seizure in the most general terms of force,
noting, “an officer seizes a person when he uses force to apprehend her.”53
Torres then turned to Terry to explain that a “seizure” of a person could take
two forms: 1) “physical force” or 2) “a ‘show of authority’ that ‘in some way
restrain[s] the liberty’ of the person.”54 Finally, the Court consulted Hodari
D.’s common law arrest version of a Fourth Amendment seizure.55 Torres
followed Hodari D.’s lead in deeming an arrest at common law to be the
“quintessential ‘seizure of the person’ under our Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence.”56
Torres reiterated that Hodari D. viewed “the mere grasping or
application of physical force with lawful authority” as an arrest.57 Whether
Hodari D.’s approach had the force of law under stare decisis was an open
question, however, since it based its holding on a different means of
performing a Fourth Amendment seizure—the suspect’s submission to the

48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Torres, 141 S. Ct. at 1004. Torres restated this conclusion slightly differently as, “[t]he
application of physical force to the body of a person with intent to restrain is a seizure, even if the
force does not succeed in subduing the person,” id. at 994.
53. Id. at 993.
54. Id. at 995.
55. Id.
56. Id. A page later in its opinion, the Court reiterated, “[a]s we have repeatedly recognized,
‘the arrest of a person is quintessentially a seizure,’” id. at 996.
57. Torres, 141 S. Ct. at 995.
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officer’s show of authority—rather than on an application of physical force.58
In search of firmer legal footing, Torres deeply explored the common law,
reaching as far back as 1604 to establish an independent basis for its
holding.59
When Torres ventured into the common law without Hodari D.’s aid,
it declared that the “‘seizure’ of a ‘person’ plainly refers to an arrest.”60 The
Court turned to no less an authority than the famous Samuel Johnson, whose
1773 dictionary defined an arrest as “[a]ny … seizure of the person.”61
Torres thus found a “linkage” between “seizure” and “arrest” since the
nation’s founding.62 The equation of a Fourth Amendment seizure with a
common law arrest provided “historical understanding” of “what was
deemed an unreasonable … seizure when the Fourth Amendment was
adopted.”63 Torres viewed the common law definition of an arrest as
universal, for all authorities, “from the earliest time to the present, establish
that a corporal touch is sufficient to constitute an arrest, even though the
defendant d[id] not submit.”64 An officer’s mere touch was so central to
determining a seizure that, “[t]he slightest application of force could satisfy
this rule.”65 The common law’s bar was so low that an officer could perform
an arrest “if he ‘had but touched the defendant even with the end of his
finger,’” or performed a “laying of hands.”66 Torres argued that American
courts adopted England’s “mere-touch rule,” with one court concluding,
“any touching, however slight, is enough.”67 Even after the Civil War, “the
cases ‘abundantly shew that the slightest touch [was] an arrest in point of
law.’”68 An officer’s touch did not even need to demonstrate control over
the arrestee, for, “it was not even required that the officer have, at the time
of such an arrest, ‘the power of keeping the party so arrested under
restraint.’”69
Torres conceded that the case before it involved a shooting rather than
“laying hands.”70 To address this problem, the Court turned to Countess of
58. Id.
59. Id. Torres’s exploration of common law took it back to the seminal case, Semayne’s Case,
5 Co. Rep. 91a, 91b, 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 196 (K. B. 1604); Id. at 1000.
60. Id. at 996.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Torres, 141 S. Ct. at 996.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 997.
69. Torres, 141 S. Ct. at 997.
70. Id.
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Rutland’s Case, a Star Chamber matter in 1605, where “serjeants-at-mace
tracked down Isabel Holcroft … shewed her their mace, and touching her
body with it, said to her, we arrest you, madam.”71 Analogizing an arrest by
the indirect touching of a mace to the indirect contact from a shooting, Torres
concluded that police could seize a person by a bullet as much as by a
finger.72 The Court then limited its mere-touch rule to applications “of force
with intent to restrain” or “to apprehend,” and not for “for some other
purpose.”73 Torres assessed this intent by focusing on “whether the
challenged conduct objectively manifests an intent to restrain.”74 Torres’s
facts, where officers first ordered Torres to stop and then shot at her to
“restrain her movement,” satisfied the objective intent requirement for
seizure of the person.75
The Court thus created a new Fourth Amendment definition of a seizure
based on force: 1) “application of physical force,” whether by hand or bullet,
upon “the body of a person,” when coupled with 2) an “intent to restrain,”
amounts to a seizure of a person.76 Since the officers in this case 1) fulfilled
an application of force by successfully shooting Torres, and did so 2) “with
intent to restrain her movement,” they performed a Fourth Amendment
seizure.77 Torres therefore held that, “the application of physical force to the
body of a person with intent to restrain is a seizure even if the person does
not submit and is not subdued.”78
C. The Dissent

Justice Gorsuch, in a dissent covering fourteen pages, aimed to educate
the Court about the “vast legal library” of common law defining a Fourth
Amendment seizure of the person.79 Accusing the Court of rewriting legal
71. Id. The Star Chamber is hardly a worthy model for constitutional propriety. The Oxford
Dictionary of British History noted that the Star Chamber “became hated because of its increasingly
draconian rulings on libel and sedition and its savage punishments. A byword for tyranny, it was
abolished by the Long Parliament in 1640.” JOHN CANNON, THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF BRITISH
HISTORY (Oxford University Press, 2009).
72. Torres, 141 S. Ct. at 997-98.
73. Id. The Court further noted, “[a]ccidental force will not qualify,” Id.
74. Id. at 997. (emphasis in original). The Court declared, “only an objective test ‘allows the
police to determine in advance whether the conduct contemplated will implicate the Fourth
Amendment.’” Id. Therefore, neither the subjective viewpoint of the officer nor the “seized person”
was determinative. Id.
75. Id. at 999. The Court emphasized the narrowness of its ruling by noting that, “a seizure by
force—absent submission—lasts only as long as the application of force.” Id. Therefore, there was
no “continuing arrest during the period of fugitivity” should the person touched flee. Id.
76. Id. at 1003.
77. Id. Torres therefore concluded, “the officers seized Torres for the instant that the bullets
struck her.” Id. at 999.
78. Torres, 141 S. Ct. at 1003.
79. Id. at 1014 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
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history rather than respecting it, the dissent envisioned the justices in the
majority “wandering about” the library “randomly grabbing volumes off the
shelf, plucking out passages” they liked, “scratching out bits” they disliked,
and then pasting this “pastiche into the U. S. Reports.”80 Justice Gorsuch
went so far as to claim that the majority’s “schizophrenic reading of the word
‘seizure’”81 disregarded “the Constitution’s original and ordinary meaning”
and bypassed “the main currents of the common law.”82 Justice Gorsuch
reproached the Court for avoiding the true meaning of common law by
committing a variety of misdeeds, including repurposing “an abusive and
long-abandoned English debt-collection practice,”83 and expanding on
dicta.84 Further, Gorsuch viewed this as a violation of canonical rules of
textual interpretation,85 disparagement of “the dominant rule of common
law,”86 and an alteration of the meaning of authorities through selective
quotation.87 As a result, the dissent declared, the Court upended “a 230 yearold understanding of our Constitution.”88
Such criticism seemed especially sharp considering every justice who
considered the case agreed to rely on common law as the guide for analyzing
a Fourth Amendment seizure.89 Justice Gorsuch aimed to remedy the
Court’s error by offering what he considered to be the true common law rule.
For the dissent, a Fourth Amendment seizure necessitated “taking possession
of someone or something”90 because, at common law, “an arrest normally
meant taking possession of an arrestee.”91 Justice Gorsuch concluded that
the police failed to seize Roxanne Torres by shooting her, since, after being
shot, she “drove 75 miles to another city” and, therefore, was “roaming at
large.”92
Thus, both the Court and the dissent took it as a given that the common
law defined a Fourth Amendment seizure of the person. Further, the Court

80. Id.
81. Id. at 1006.
82. Id. at 1003.
83. Id.
84. Torres, 141 S. Ct. at 1005.
85. Id. at 1007.
86. Id. at 1017.
87. Id. at 1010.
88. Id. at 1016.
89. The Court expressly referred to the common law to interpret the Fourth Amendment, as
when declaring, “[f]irst, common law arrests are Fourth Amendment seizures.” Id. at 995. The
dissent deemed the common law to be one of the “traditional sources of authority” in interpreting
the Fourth Amendment, Id. at 1003.
90. Torres, 141 S. Ct. at 1003.
91. Id. at 1011.
92. Id. at 1003-04.
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and the dissent each believed that an arrest provided the test for a seizure.
The justices feuded, however, over the narrow question of whether a seizure
required the successful taking of possession.93 As will be discussed below,
neither the Court nor the dissent offered protection for the Terry stop and
frisk.

IV. The Logical Implications of Torres v. Madrid’s Common
Law Definition of Seizure of a Person
A. Terry Based its Analysis on Balancing the Competing Concerns of the
Government and Citizens Rather than on Constitutional Text, Leaving
its Ruling Vulnerable to Torres v. Madrid’s Common Law Definition
of a Fourth Amendment “Seizure of a Person”

As previously noted, Torres equated a Fourth Amendment seizure with
an arrest,94 emphasized that an arrest could occur with the slightest touch,95
and found that an arrest could occur even if it failed to subdue the arrestee.96
Such bold pronouncements would have been news to the justices who
decided Terry, the holding of which Torres placed in jeopardy.97 If Torres
is correct that a seizure is defined by an arrest, then what is a Terry stop,
which the Terry Court viewed as a Fourth Amendment seizure separate from
arrest98 Moreover, since arrests can only be justified by probable cause, how
may police lawfully perform Terry frisks when the Torres threshold of
“slightest force” and “laying of hands” requires only reasonable suspicion?99
A full understanding of the precarious position Torres placed Terry in
starts with a close examination of the Terry opinion. Chief Justice Warren,
who wrote the opinion in Terry, fully understood the profound importance
of the issue facing the Court.100 He began the Court’s analysis with the
acknowledgement that, “[t]his case presents serious questions concerning the

93. The dueling opinions resulting from this focused inquiry demonstrate the notion that it is
the civil wars that are the bloodiest. Bethany Lacina, Explaining the Severity of Civil Wars, 50 J.
CONFLICT RESOL., 276, 289 (2006).
94. Torres, 141 S. Ct. at 996.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. We have an indirect clue that Terry’s justices would have viewed Torres as problematic
because Justice Stevens, one of the longest serving justices on the Court, balked at the reasoning in
Hodari D., where the Court offered a less fully formed version of Torres’s reasoning, Hodari D.,
499 U.S. at 635-38 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
98. Terry, 392 U.S. at 22-23.
99. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21.
100. Terry noted, “[w]e would be less than candid if we did not acknowledge that this question
thrusts to the fore difficult and troublesome issues regarding a sensitive area of police activity—
issues which have never before been squarely presented to this Court,” id. at 9-10.
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role of the Fourth Amendment in the confrontation on the street between the
citizen and the policeman investigating suspicious circumstances.”101
The high stakes caused the Court to spend considerable effort in
reviewing the facts. The case began during the afternoon of Halloween,
1963, when Cleveland Police Detective Martin McFadden noticed two men,
Terry and Chilton, who “didn’t look right.”102 Drawing on experience gained
from being an officer for 39 years, a detective for 35 years, and patrolling
“this vicinity of downtown Cleveland for shoplifters and pickpockets” for 30
years, McFadden carefully observed Terry and Chilton.103 He saw both men
taking turns in walking by a store, pausing to look in the store window,
walking on a short distance, turning around and walking back, and pausing
once again to look in the same store window.104 The two would then confer
at the corner between visits past the store.105 Moreover, they “repeated this
ritual alternately between five and six times apiece—in all, roughly a dozen
trips.”106 Suspecting “the two men of ‘casing a job, a stick-up,” and fearing
they might have a gun, the detective approached the two men, who by this
time had been joined by a third man, Katz.107 When the three “mumbled
something” after McFadden had identified himself as an officer and asked
for their names, the detective grabbed Terry, “spun him around so that they
were facing the other two, with Terry between McFadden and the others, and
patted down the outside of his clothing.”108 Feeling a pistol in the breast
pocket of Terry’s overcoat, McFadden reached in, recovering “.38-caliber
revolver.”109 The detective then patted down Chilton, finding another gun.110
At the motion to suppress the guns, the trial court found that McFadden
had no probable cause to support an arrest.111 The trial judge, however,
found the frisk reasonable because “without it ‘the answer to the police
officer may be a bullet.’”112 In considering the issue “whether it is always
unreasonable for a policeman to seize a person and subject him to a limited
search for weapons unless there is probable cause for an arrest,” Terry was
keenly aware of the weighty concerns the case involved.113 For the
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id. at 1, 5.
Id. at 5.
Id.
Id. at 6.
Terry, 392 U.S. at 6.
Id.
Id. at 6-7.
Id. at 7.
Terry, 392 U.S. at 7.
Id.
Id. at 7-8.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 15.
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government, the case implicated interests beyond the investigation and
prevention of crime, to the very life of the officer on patrol.114 Against this
concern the Court had to weigh the “inestimable,” even “sacred” right “of
every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from
all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable
authority of law.”115 Further, Terry emphasized that the right of “personal
security belongs as much to the citizen on the streets of our cities as to the
homeowner closeted in his study to dispose of his secret affairs.”116
The parties presented the Court with a choice between extremes. The
government, urging that a stop and a frisk “amounted to a mere ‘minor
inconvenience and petty indignity,”117 suggested that these official actions
fell “outside the purview of the Fourth Amendment” because neither act rose
to the level of a search or seizure.118 Against this argument, the defense
contended that there was no “variety of police activity which does not depend
solely upon the voluntary cooperation of the citizen and yet which stops short
of an arrest based upon probable cause to make such an arrest.”119 The Court
rejected both the position that a stop and frisk was a constitutional nonevent120 and the claim that these intrusions must be “strictly circumscribed
by the law of arrest and search.”121 Instead of “a rigid all-or-nothing model,”
Terry charted a new, middle course.122 The Court recognized that the officer
did implicate Terry’s Fourth Amendment rights with intrusions that fell short
of a traditional arrest and search incident to arrest, but it also decided that
these limited intrusions merited only limited protections.123
The Court declared that there was no question Terry “was entitled to the
protection of the Fourth Amendment as he walked down the street in

114. The Court recognized that, “there is the more immediate interest of the police officer in
taking steps to assure himself that the person with whom he is dealing is not armed with a weapon
that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against him,” id. at 23.
115. Terry, 392 U.S. at 8-9.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 10.
118. Id. at 16.
119. Id. at 11.
120. In fact, the Court “emphatically reject(ed)” such a notion, Id. at 16. Terry declared, “[w]e
therefore reject the notions that the Fourth Amendment does not come into play at all as a limitation
upon police conduct if the officers stop short of something called a ‘technical arrest’ or a ‘fullblown search,’” Terry, 392 U.S. at 19. The Court also noted, “Courts which sit under our
Constitution cannot and will not be made party to lawless invasions of the constitutional rights of
citizens by permitting unhindered governmental use of the fruits of such invasions.” Terry, 392
U.S. at 13.
121. Id. at 11.
122. Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 637 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
123. Id.
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Cleveland.”124 This was because, “the Fourth Amendment governs
‘seizures’ of the person which do not eventuate in a trip to the station house
and prosecution for crime—’arrests’ in traditional terminology.”125 To hold
otherwise would “isolate from constitutional scrutiny the initial stages of the
contact between the policeman and the citizen.”126 Terry declared,
“whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to
walk away, he has ‘seized’ that person.”127 Terry then provided the
following definition of a Fourth Amendment seizure of a person: “[o]nly
when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in
some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a ‘seizure’
has occurred.”128
The Court determined that McFadden had also searched Terry within
the Fourth Amendment because, “it is nothing less than sheer torture of the
English language to suggest that a careful exploration of the outer surfaces
of a person’s clothing all over his or her body in an attempt to find weapons
is not a ‘search.’”129 Since McFadden had triggered Fourth Amendment
application with both a seizure and a search, the Court considered the
reasonableness130 of these actions by conducting two inquiries: 1) whether
the officer’s action “was justified at its inception,” and, 2) whether the
intrusion “was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which
justified the interference in the first place.”131 Such a test set up a sliding
scale where a lesser intrusion needed lesser justification.
Here,
reasonableness involved a balancing of two competing interests: the
government’s need to seize or search against the degree of the intrusion on
the individual.132 For the first part of the test, the initial intrusion in the form
of a stop, the officer’s seizure of Terry did not constitute an arrest, so no
probable cause was needed.133 Instead, McFadden needed to point to
“specific and articulable facts” that would “warrant an objectively

124. Terry, 392 U.S. at 9.
125. Id. at 16.
126. Id. at 17.
127. Id. at 16.
128. Id. at 19, n. 16.
129. Id. at 16.
130. The Court applied a general “reasonableness” test since it was confronted “with an entire
rubric of police conduct—necessarily swift action predicated upon the on-the-spot observations of
the officer on the beat—which historically has not been, and as a practical matter could not be,
subjected to the warrant procedure.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 20.
131. Terry, 392 U.S. at 20.
132. Terry explained, “there is ‘no ready test for determining reasonableness other than by
balancing the need to search (or seize) against the invasion which the search (or seizure) entails,”
Id. at 21.
133. Id. at 22.
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reasonable person to believe ‘that the action taken was appropriate.’”134
McFadden’s detailed rendition of the specific acts he saw Terry and Chilton
perform demonstrated that his initial approach was reasonable; in fact, it
“would have been poor police work indeed” if he had failed to investigate.135
The “governmental interests” supported the detective’s efforts in “effective
crime prevention and detection.”136
The second part of Terry’s reasonableness inquiry, dealing with the
“scope” of the intrusion, considered McFadden’s frisk of Terry for
weapons.137 Here, the balance of interests tilted in the government’s favor
because, with McFadden’s suspicions of a “stick up” and the propensity of
American criminals for armed violence, the Court could not “blind” itself “to
the need for law enforcement officers to protect themselves and other
prospective victims of violence in situations where they may lack probable
cause for an arrest.”138 In contrast to the high interests of the state, the
defendant’s interests were less than they would be in a full search incident
to arrest because the “protective search for weapons” amounted to “a brief,
though far from inconsiderable, intrusion upon the sanctity of the person.”139
Terry thus concluded that McFadden conducted a lawful seizure and search,
therefore upholding the admission of the weapon.140
In assessing the stop and frisk, a practice which, if abused, could lead
to “wholesale harassment”141 and, if denied, could cause an officer’s injury
of death,142 Terry meant to carefully craft a Solomonic test that would
maintain both judicial oversight and officer safety.143 The Terry test wove
together two rules: 1) the Fourth Amendment expanded to apply to stops and
frisks,144 and 2) these intrusions would be judged by a less demanding
standard than those used for arrests.145 Justice Stevens noted that Terry
“necessarily concluded that the word ‘seizure’ in the Fourth Amendment
encompasses official restraints on individual freedom that fall short of a
common-law arrest.” 146 Terry thus expanded the Fourth Amendment by

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id. at 21-22.
Id. at 22, 23.
Id. at 22.
Terry, 392 U.S. at 23.
Id. at 23-24.
Id. at 26.
Id. at 30.
Terry, 392 U.S. at 14.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 19.
Id. at 21-22.
Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 635 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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broadening “the range of encounters between the police and the citizen” that
would be defined as a “seizure.”147
At “the same time,” however, Terry necessarily lowered the standard of
proof needed “to justify a ‘stop’ in the newly expanded category of
seizures.”148 Due to the need for flexibility, Terry “held that ‘reasonable’
suspicion—a quantum of proof less demanding than probable cause—was
adequate to justify a stop for investigatory purposes.”149 Justice Stevens saw
one rule as the “corollary” of the other.150 With Torres, the Court pulled at
one of Terry’s strings, threatening to unravel the entire rule. If Torres is
correct that a seizure is an arrest at common law, then there is no longer any
Constitutional basis for a seizure that does not rise to an arrest. With no
Terry stop and frisk, there is no need to accept the lesser justification of
reasonable suspicion for any Fourth Amendment seizure.
Such a result would have pleased Justice Douglas, who vehemently
dissented in Terry.151 He was mystified that the Court could find
McFadden’s seizure and search of Terry to be Constitutional under the
Fourth Amendment even though these intrusions lacked probable cause.152
Douglas explained, “police officers up to today have been permitted to effect
arrests or searches without warrants only when the facts within their personal
knowledge would satisfy the constitutional standard of probable cause.”153
He continued, “[r]espect for our constitutional system and personal liberty
demands” adherence to probable cause154 because this traditional standard
rang “a bell of certainty” deeply embedded in the nation’s history that
reasonable suspicion did not.155 Rumors, or even “strong reason to suspect,”
did not provide early American officers with the authority to arrest.156 Terry,
by diluting the standard of certainty for a seizure or search, endowed police
with “greater authority to make a ‘seizure’ and conduct a ‘search’ than a
judge has to authorize such action.”157 Douglas viewed Terry’s reasonable
suspicion standard in the starkest terms, declaring it a “long step down the

147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Terry, 392 U.S. at 35 (Douglas, dissenting).
152. Justice Douglas declared, “[b]ut it is a mystery how that ‘search’ and that ‘seizure’ can be
constitutional by Fourth Amendment standards, unless there was ‘probable cause,’” Id. (Douglas,
dissenting).
153. Terry, 392 U.S. at 37 (emphasis added).
154. Id. at 35, n. 1.
155. Id. at 37.
156. Id. at 37-38.
157. Id. at 36. Justice Douglas contended that such a ruling was “precisely the opposite” of
repeated rulings of the Court. Id.

100

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

Vol. 49:2

totalitarian path” where the individual, no longer sovereign, could be picked
up by any officer who did “not like the cut of his jib.”158
Thus, Terry, aiming to strike a balance between the need to maintain
judicial supervision over officers’ actions falling short of arrest and officers’
concerns for effective investigation and personal safety, both recognized the
“stop” as a Fourth Amendment seizure and lessened the justification for this
lesser intrusion.159 As demonstrated by Justice Douglas’s dissent, this
framework was controversial from the start. The Court, in creating the stop
and frisk to address the practical realities of policing in a modern society, did
not focus on common law crafted centuries ago. Lacking textual support
from the Fourth Amendment or precedent from common law, Terry was
vulnerable to challenge.160
B. Logical Consistency, in the Wake of Torres v. Madrid’s Reasoning,
Would Require the Court to Choose Between the Unpalatable Options
of Overturning Terry or Divorcing Itself from Strict Adherence to the
Common Law Interpretation of the Fourth Amendment

The force of Torres’s logic presents the Court with a stark choice: either
acknowledge that Terry is no longer good law or abandon an unduly strict
adherence to common law in recognition of evolving societal needs, such as
the citizenry’s expectation of effective crime prevention and officers’
concern for personal safety from firearms. The first option would result in
wrenching change caused by overturning over half a century of precedent.
The second option might be no more palatable, for it would call into question
a judicial philosophy that forms the bedrock for many members of the current
Court.
Ultimately, if the Court believes in the need to view today’s Fourth
Amendment issues only through the lens of common law crafted centuries
ago, this principle will require the Court to demonstrate the courage of its
convictions in reassessing, if not overturning, Terry. Such an approach
seems doctrinally unavoidable. Torres’s definition of a Fourth Amendment
seizure as a common law arrest raises two fundamental questions. First, is a
stop and frisk, in which an officer lays hands on a person over which he or
she exercises control, now an arrest? If so, does a Terry stop and frisk,

158. Id. at 38-39.
159. Terry declared, “[i]t is quite plain that the Fourth Amendment governs ‘seizures’ of the
person which do not eventuate in a trip to the station house and prosecution for crime—’arrests’ in
traditional terminology. It must be recognized that whenever a police officer accosts an individual
and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has ‘seized’ that person,” Terry, 392 U.S. at 16.
160. As Justice Stevens explained, “Terry unequivocally rejected the notion that the common
law of arrest defines the limits of the term “seizure” in the Fourth Amendment,” Hodari D., 499
U.S. at 637.
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performed on mere reasonable suspicion, now violate the Fourth
Amendment?
Torres’s language in defining a seizure as a common law arrest was
hardly circumspect. The Court, stating that the common law deemed an
arrest as any “seizure of the person,”161 identified a link between seizure and
arrest that went back to the “nation’s very founding.”162 Such an equation
between arrest and seizure left no room for a Terry stop and frisk, which was
neither an arrest nor known to our Founders. Terry’s viability was further
eroded by Torres’s description of the minimum force that could trigger an
arrest as “any touching, however slight,” with a “laying of hands,” or even
“the end of [a] finger.”163 Terry’s frisk would easily fulfill this minimal
standard, as demonstrated by Terry’s own description of a frisk:
[T]he officer must feel with sensitive fingers every portion of the
prisoner’s body. A thorough search must be made of the prisoner’s arms and
armpits, waistline and back, the groin and area about the testicles, and entire
surface of the legs down to the feet.164
The Terry Court deemed such a probing search to be “a serious intrusion
upon the sanctity of the person, which may inflict great indignity and arouse
strong resentment, and it is not to be undertaken lightly.165 Seen through
Torres’s eyes, an officer’s feeling with “sensitive fingers” every part of a
person’s body, including the groin, certainly clears an arrest’s standard of a
tap by a mace or “any touching, however slight” with the end of a finger.166
Torres, however, included an objective “intent to restrain” or “to
apprehend” requirement in its arrest definition, noting that mere accidental
contact would not qualify as an arrest.167 Here, Terry, once again, fulfills
Torres’s arrest standard because a frisk, especially of a person’s sensitive
places, cannot be effectively done without first apprehending and restraining
a person; frisks are not effectively performed on those who are resisting or
fleeing. A Terry frisk, necessitating the suspect to be under the officer’s
control, exceeds the requirements of a Torres arrest, which can be
accomplished even when the suspect succeeds in fleeing.168 Torres
emphasized that some arrests, “did not culminate in actual control of the
individual, let alone a trip to the goal,” because an arresting officer need only,

161. Torres, 141 S. Ct. at 996.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Terry, 392 U.S. at 17, n. 13.
165. Terry, 392 U.S. at 17.
166. Torres, 141 S. Ct. at 996.
167. Id. at 998.
168. An officer fulfills a Torres arrest “even if the person does not submit and is not subdued,”
id. at 1003.
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“for one moment,” take possession of the suspect’s person.169 Therefore,
Officers Madrid and Williamson satisfied Torres’s common law arrest rule
even though Torres continued to flee for 75 miles.170 In Terry, McFadden
spun Terry around, patted him down, and reached into the breast pocket of
his coat to recover a gun.171 Terry’s seizure, in spinning an individual around
and changing the direction that the person is facing, and then probing the
surfaces of clothing for a weapon, involved unquestioned control of another
person. Thus, even with the intent requirement, there exists a clear answer
to our first question about the severity of the Terry stop and frisk—after
Torres, a stop and frisk would now clearly satisfy the definition of an arrest.
Deeming a Terry stop and frisk to be an arrest prompts exploration of
the second question about whether a Terry stop and frisk based on mere
reasonable suspicion violates the Fourth Amendment. A Terry stop and
frisk, amounting to a Torres arrest, needs the support of probable cause
because any arrest, to be constitutionally valid, requires that the arresting
officer, “at the moment of arrest,” have the “probable cause to make it.”172
Quite simply, Terry’s reasonable suspicion no longer satisfies this
fundamental Fourth Amendment mandate.173
The current Court could overrule Terry because Terry’s own reasoning
gave the Court an opening to do away with the stop and frisk. While Terry
did reference common law by noting the sacredness of an individual’s right
to control one’s own person,174 the Court meant to address modern concerns,
such as “police-community tensions in the crowded centers of our Nation’s
cities.”175 To rule on these contemporary troubles, Terry weighed the
competing interests of the government and the citizen.176 Terry, which
Justice Scalia described as representing “the original-meaning-is-irrelevant,
169. Id. at 1000.
170. Id. at 1004.
171. Terry, 392 U.S. at 7.
172. Justice Stevens noted, “[p]rior to Terry, the Fourth Amendment proscribed any seizure of
the person that was not supported by the same probable-cause showing that would justify a
custodial arrest,” Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 635 (Stevens, J., dissenting). He continued, “in Terry, the
Court abandoned its traditional view that a seizure under the Fourth Amendment required probable
cause, and, instead, expanded the definition of a seizure to include an investigative stop made on
less than probable cause,” Terry, 392 U.S. at 637. The Court has required probable cause for arrest;
“Whether that arrest was constitutionally valid depends in turn upon whether, at the moment the
arrest was made, the officers had probable cause to make it—whether at that moment the facts and
circumstances within their knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information
were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the petitioner had committed or was
committing an offense.” Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964).
173. Once a Terry stop graduates into an arrest, police need probable cause to support this
greater intrusion, Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 507 (1983).
174. Terry, 392 U.S. at 9.
175. Id. at 9, 12.
176. Id. at 22-25.
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good-policy-is-constitutional-law school of jurisprudence,” did not bother to
consider authorities such as the Countess of Rutland’s Case.177 Ironically,
this once modern approach has lost much of its currency with today’s Court.
The Court has repeatedly turned to the Founding era, in a variety of
contexts, to analyze Fourth Amendment issues. Carpenter v. United States
harkened back to the “Founding generation,” and the colonial era when
considering something as modern as government surveillance of cell-site
location information.178 Atwater v. City of Lago Vista turned the clock all
the way back to the Statute of Winchester in 1285 to assess the lawfulness
of an arrest.179 In Virginia v. Moore, the Court “look[ed] to the statutes and
common law of the founding era to determine the norms that the Fourth
Amendment was meant to preserve” to decide whether to suppress evidence
obtained during an arrest in violation of state law.180 These cases offer
examples of the Court’s turn to originalism, a judicial philosophy
championed by Justice Bork a mere eight years after Terry was handed
down.181 As noted by Brandon J. Murrill, “[f]or many years, some prominent
scholars (such as Robert Bork) argued that in interpreting the Constitution,
one should look to the original intent of the people who drafted, proposed,
adopted, or ratified the Constitution to determine what those people wanted
to convey through the text.”182 Originalism has become so accepted at the
Court that even Justice Elena Kagan, hardly known as a conservative justice,
has conceded that “we [the Justices] are all originalists.”183
One member of the Court has already explicitly questioned the viability
of the Terry stop and frisk. Justice Scalia, concurring in Minnesota v.
Dickerson, announced that he was unaware “of any precedent” to support
Terry’s “physical search of a person thus temporarily detained for
questioning.”184 The common law would only allow a “frisk” during “a full
custodial arrest on probable cause,” and this search would be allowed only
because “a full physical search incident to the arrest” is justified during an

177. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 382 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring).
178. Carpenter v. U.S. 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2213, 2214, 2211 (2018). Justice Thomas, in dissent,
even considered “Locke and the English legal tradition,” id. at 2239 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
179. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 333 (2001).
180. Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 168 (2008).
181. Robert H. Bork offered his originalist views in a 1984 lecture series, BRANDON J.
MURRILL, MODES OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 7 (Congressional Research Service,
2018), citing ROBERT H. BORK, TRADITION AND MORALITY IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE
FRANCIS BOYER LECTURES ON PUBLIC POLICY 10 (1984).
182. Id. at 7.
183. Id. at 9 (citing THE NOMINATION OF ELENA KAGAN TO BE AN ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: HEARING BEFORE THE S. COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY PART 1, 111th Cong. 62 (2010)).
184. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 381 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring).

104

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

Vol. 49:2

arrest.185 Ominously for Terry, since a “detention did not rise to the level of
a full-blown arrest (and was not supported by the degree of cause needful for
that purpose), there appears to be no clear support at common law for
physically searching the suspect.”186 Finally, Justice Scalia “frankly
doubt(ed)”:
[W]hether the fiercely proud men who adopted our Fourth Amendment
would have allowed themselves to be subjected, on mere suspicion of being
armed and dangerous, to such indignity—which is described as follows in a
police manual:
Check the subject’s neck and collar. A check should be made under the
subject’s arm. Next a check should be made of the upper back. The lower
back should also be checked. “A check should be made of the upper part of
the man’s chest and the lower region around the stomach. The belt, a favorite
concealment spot, should be checked. The inside thigh and crotch area also
should be searched. The legs should be checked for possible weapons. The
last items to be checked are the shoes and cuffs of the subject.187
What if, after Torres, the Court came to share Justice Scalia’s doubt,
substituting the mace that touched the countess for the balancing scales Terry
so carefully employed? Terry itself understood the dangers that would be
unleashed in dooming the stop and frisk. The Terry Court realized that the
frisk protected an interest beyond the mere investigation of crime—the
safety and even the life of the officer.188 Outlawing the frisk would be
“clearly unreasonable” because it would unnecessarily deny the officer the
means to neutralize a threat that kills many officers and wounds thousands
more.189 The argument that officers could perform a search once they had
probable cause ignored a harsh reality; “a perfectly reasonable apprehension
of danger may arise long before the officer is possessed of adequate
information to justify taking a person into custody for the purpose of
prosecuting him for a crime.”190
Doing away with the Terry stop and frisk would place the Court in a
terrible bind, for the stop and frisk enables an officer to perform functions to
which even Terry, as the petitioner, did not object. The Court in Terry stated:
Petitioner does not argue that a police officer should refrain from
making any investigation of suspicious circumstances until such time as he
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 381-82.
188. Terry noted, “[w]e are now concerned with more than the governmental interest in
investigating crime; in addition, there is the more immediate interest of the police officer in taking
steps to assure himself that the person with whom he is dealing is not armed with a weapon that
could unexpectedly and fatally be used against him,” Terry, 392 U.S. at 23 (1968).
189. Id. at 23-24.
190. Id. at 26-27.
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has probable cause to make an arrest; nor does he deny that police officers
in properly discharging their investigative function may find themselves
confronting persons who might well be armed and dangerous. Moreover, he
does not say that an officer is always unjustified in searching a suspect to
discover weapons.191
Even Justice Scalia, a “leading practitioner” of originalism,192 was in
no rush to remove the Terry stop and frisk outright. He surmised that the
frisk, even if impermissible in 1791, might be considered Constitutional in
1868, with the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment.193 He considered that
Terry could survive by reason of the advent of “concealed weapons capable
of harming the interrogator quickly and from beyond arm’s reach.”194 Justice
Scalia even flirted with the idea of adhering to Terry’s ruling that police may
perform a frisk while at the same time excluding, “the evidence incidentally
discovered, on the theory that half a constitutional guarantee is better than
none.”195 Ultimately, the best Justice Scalia could say about Terry’s creation
of the frisk was that while, “I do not favor the mode of analysis in Terry, I
cannot say that its result was wrong.”196 Thus, in the wake of Torres, Terry
is vulnerable. The Court is faced with a pressing need to clarify the law by
either swapping the Countess of Rutland’s Case for Terry in pursuit of
191. Id. at 25.
192. Jeremy Telman, Originalism: A Thing Worth Doing, 42 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 529, 529
(2016).
193. Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 382 (Scalia, J., concurring).
194. Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 382.
195. Id.
196. Id. However, following the force of Torres’s logic to deem the Terry stop and frisk
unreasonable without the common law’s probable cause would address the concerns of reformers
who see in Terry an invitation to limitless intrusions, exacerbation of community tensions, racial
profiling, and an attack on dignity, see Michael S. Klein, Plain Touch and Stop-and-Frisk Policing:
The Intersection of Race, Drugs, and Disorder, 53 CRIM. LAW BULL. 1189 (2017). The Terry Court
itself understood the costs of a stop and frisk, declaring, “[e]ven a limited search of the outer
clothing for weapons constitutes a severe, though brief, intrusion upon cherished personal security,
and it must surely be an annoying, frightening, and perhaps humiliating experience,” Terry, 392
U.S. at 24-25. Further, encounters with police, whether by Terry stops or arrests, can turn deadly.
“American police forces killed three people per day in 2019, for a total of nearly 1,100 killings,”
Tucker Higgins & John W. Schoen, These 4 charts describe police violence in America, CNBC
POLITICS (June 1, 2020), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/06/01/george-floyd-death-police-violencein-the-us-in-4-charts.html. Reformers could take a page out of Torres’s book by referring to the
understanding of the Founders in quoting Dunaway v. New York: “Hostility to seizures based on
mere suspicion was a prime motivation for the adoption of the Fourth Amendment, and decisions
immediately after its adoption affirmed that “common rumor or report, suspicion, or even ‘strong
reason to suspect’ was not adequate to support a warrant for arrest,” Dunaway v. New York, 442
U.S. 200, 213 (1979). The Court’s unlikely abandonment of the Terry stop and frisk would amount
to a dramatic about-face for a Court which has repeatedly eroded Fourth Amendment protection
against Terry’s intrusions. For instance, “[s]ince the Court created reasonable suspicion, it has
authorized police to consider your ethnicity, where you live, what you wear, and how you behave
as factors for consideration,” Thomas B. McAffee, Terry, Traffic Stops, and Tragedy: Conflicts
and Concerns in the Wake of Kansas v. Glover, 19 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 251, 271 (2020).
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consistent originalism or holding its nose, acknowledging the evolution of
the law, and reaffirming Terry’s legitimacy.
C. Application of Common Law Rules to Policing Today Should Be
Performed with a Recognition that Centuries-Old Institutions and
Norms Cannot Supply Every Answer to Fourth Amendment Issues.

In the first line of his novel, The Go-Between, L. P. Hartley writes,
“[t]he past is a foreign country: they do things differently there.”197 While
the law during the time of the Founders rightly informs constitutional
inquiry, perhaps application of legal rules crafted centuries ago should be
tempered with a recognition that the concerns facing both the citizenry and
the police have changed drastically since English common law was defining
a seizure of a person. In a time when police can employ a robot wielding a
C4-bomb to end a standoff198 and can hunt down a serial killer with
genealogical DNA,199 arguing over whether a countess was “seized” by the
tap of a mace might demonstrate rigidity rather than fidelity. Even a brief
overview of the times of common law reveals the chasm between England’s
Edward I and the present day.200
Today’s police likely would not even recognize as fellow officers the
persons making arrests in some of the cases cited by Torres. The Torres
Court heavily relied on the Countess of Rutland’s Case, which dated from
1605,201 while the dissent went as far back as Seint John’s Case in 1592 to
counter the Court’s claims.202 The Statute of Winchester, in 1285, defined
law enforcement’s obligations in the 1500’s and 1600’s in England.203 The

197. L.P. HARTLEY, THE GO-BETWEEN 17 (New York Review Books, 1953).
198. Alina Selyukh & Gabriel Roseneberg, Bomb Robots: What Makes Killing In Dallas
Different And What Happens Next?, NAT’L. PUB. RADIO (July 8, 2016),
https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/07/08/485262777/for-the-first-time-police-useda-bomb-robot-to-kill.
199. Aja Romano, DNA Profiles from Ancestry Websites Helped Identify the Golden State
Killer Suspect: He Wasn’t the First Criminal to Fall to Familial DNA Matching, and He Won’t Be
the Last, VOX (Apr. 27, 2018), https://www.vox.com/2018/4/27/17290288/golden-state-killerjoseph-james-deangelo-dna-profile-match.
200. King Edward I (1272-1307), who enacted the Statute of Winchester (1285), has been
called “the English Justinian” for reigning over “one of the most important eras of legal reform in
English legal history,” Jonathan Rose, The Legal Profession in Medieval England: A History of
Regulation, 48 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1, 34-35 (1998). “The Statute of Winchester, 1285, was “the
great legislative landmark which crystallized then current rules and practices. For several centuries
it afforded authoritative guidance to courts and writers,” Jerome Hall, Legal and Social Aspects of
Arrest Without Warrant, 49 HARV. L. REV. 566, 579 (1936).
201. Torres, 141 S. Ct. at 997.
202. Id. at 1013 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
203. J.M. BEATTIE, POLICING AND PUNISHMENT IN LONDON, 1660—1750: URBAN CRIME
AND THE LIMITS OF TERROR, 114 (Oxford University Press, 2001). The Court, in Atwater v. City
of Lago Vista, has referred to the Statute of Winchester in analyzing the Fourth Amendment seizure
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Statute of Winchester provided the legal basis for the night watch204 which,
in the era before electricity, dealt with the “heightened threat of danger” that
came with darkness.205 The rules of the day required that, should anyone
commit a serious crime, villagers were to “raise a ‘hue and cry,’ and, upon
hearing the call, to bring their own weapons and pursue the criminal.”206 As
late as 1660, the constables keeping order were not the career officers of
today. Instead, these officials “were expected to be neither paid nor
experienced, but ordinary citizens, serving for a year in turn.”207 Even in
1700, England did not have a “public body” that investigated crimes or
gathered evidence for criminal prosecution; such tasks were “left to the
victim.”208 Into this vacuum came the “thief-taker,” who would seek out and
prosecute criminals for profit.209 The profit motive distorted thief-takers’
incentives, causing them to commit “shady,” “illegal,” and even “vicious”
practices, such as entrapment210 or the planting of evidence.211 In short,
England did not create professional police forces “until the mid-nineteenth
century.”212
Even the officers who enforced the laws at the time of the framers—the
era informing the Fourth Amendment—performed seizures of persons in a
context importantly different from today. As in England, there were neither
police departments nor professional law enforcement officers in the North
American colonies or early states.213 Law enforcement in the new nation
consisted of unsalaried freemen pressed into service for one year.214 Rather
than investigate crimes, a constable, typically only numbering one per parish

of a person in the specific context of arrest, Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 333
(2001).
204. BEATTIE, supra note 203, at 173.
205. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 333-34. As J. M. Beattie noted, “[r]obbery and murder were ‘the
most vile Works of Darkness.’” Therefore, “the anxieties that darkness gave rise to had been met
by the formation of a night watch in the thirteenth century, and by rules about who could use the
streets after dark,” BEATTIE, supra note 203, at 169. The Statute of Winchester (1285) provided for
the hue and cry duty, Jerome Hall, Legal and Social Aspects of Arrest Without Warrant, 49 HARV.
L. REV. 566, 579-80 (1936).
206. David B. Kopel, It Isn’t About Duck Hunting: The British Origins of the Right to Bear
Arms, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1333, 1337 (1995).
207. BEATTIE, supra note 203, at 114.
208. Id. at 226.
209. Id. at 217.
210. Id.
211. 53 Brian K. Pinaire, Who Let (The) Dog Out? On the British Roots of American Bounty
Hunting, 47 CRIM. LAW BULL. 1169, 1176 (2011).
212. Kopel, supra note 206, at 1337.
213. Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547,
620 (1999).
214. Id. at 620-21.
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or ward, would watch taverns for drunks or fights.215 In most cases, victims,
rather than police, initiated the criminal justice process by raising the “hue
and cry” or swearing out a complaint.216
Therefore, the Torres Court, in limiting the definition of today’s
seizures within the confines of common law, are jamming a square peg into
a round hole. The Court relied on the norms of a preindustrial society
oppressed each night by darkness to determine the rights of a postindustrial
age that never sleeps. Torres employed rules meant for unsavory thief takers
or civilians mandated to respond to a hue and cry to professionals spending
their entire careers in government. The Court used rules meant to govern
annual placeholders who reacted as crimes occurred to organized
departments who aim to proactively prevent crime. As the legal
commentator, Thomas Y. Davies, noted, applying “the original meaning of
the language of the Fourth Amendment in a completely changed social and
institutional context would subvert the purpose the Framers had in mind
when they adopted the text.”217 He further warned:
[E]ven constitutional standards cannot remain static when everything to
which they relate undergoes change. Even constitutional law is not
autonomous from larger social, institutional, and political changes. The
reality of deep change since the framing means that the original meaning
generally cannot directly speak to modern issues.218
The Court itself has recognized the limits of originalism. Even Hodari
D. conceded that not every common law rule should be “elevated to
constitutional proscription.”219 Indeed, in Tennessee v. Garner, another case
involving a seizure by shooting, the Court explicitly stated that the common
law could not “be directly translated to the present day.”220 Garner refused
to constrain its ruling to common law because it recognized the change in
circumstances that had accrued over the centuries.221 While Garner’s
changed circumstances involved the increasing sophistication in firearms
and evolution in the law of arrest, the changes confronting Torres span not
only advancing technology and law, but also the very character of law
enforcement and society’s expectations regarding crime prevention.222

215. Id.
216. Id. at 622.
217. Davies, supra note 213 at 740-41.
218. Id. at 741.
219. Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 626, n. 2 (1991).
220. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 14 (1985).
221. Id.
222. Garner noted, “In short, though the common-law pedigree of Tennessee’s rule is pure on
its face, changes in the legal and technological context mean the rule is distorted almost beyond
recognition when literally applied,” id. at 15.
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If the Court should again acknowledge that there are limits to the
constitutional guidance provided by common law, where could it turn? Can
the Court release itself from the grip of common law without risking
wrenching change? As noted in Part IV.D. below, a solution exists near at
hand that will allow the Court to avoid the extreme of overturning fifty years
of precedent due to the touching of a countess with a mace.
D. The More Practical, and Less Radical, Solution for the Court Would
Be to Recognize Terry as Valid Precedent in the Long Evolution of
Fourth Amendment Interpretation

The Court, instead of provoking the uncertainty that would come with
overturning a half-century of precedent that has occurred since its decision
in Terry, should loosen its grip on originalism, or more properly, free itself
from the grip of this judicial philosophy. As noted on the Supreme Court’s
own website, Chief Justice John Marshall, cousin of the author of the
Declaration of Independence, understanding that the Constitution was not
stuck in the amber of common law, declared, “[w]e must never forget that it
is a constitution we are expounding … intended to endure for ages to come,
and consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs.”223
The wisest course for the Court would be to ensure that Torres’s cleaving to
the common law of arrest not limit Fourth Amendment protection against
unreasonable seizures of the person.
Instead, the Court should do something utterly unremarkable—adhere
to precedent. Torres’s reliance on common law, to the virtual exclusion of
all other authority, amounted to an extension of Hodari D., a case in which
Justice Stevens identified the danger of the Court’s self-imposed common
law blinders. Justice Stevens noted that Hodari D.’s “narrow construction”
of a Fourth Amendment seizure represented a “significant” and “unfortunate
departure” from, and unfaithfulness to, prior case law.224 He explained that
the Court “ignor[ed]” Terry, which simply ruled that officers seized a person
“when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in
some way restrained the liberty of a citizen.”225 Thus, the “touchstone of a
seizure is the restraint of an individual’s personal liberty ‘in some way.’”226
This broad language provides more extensive protection because it applies
the Fourth Amendment when liberty is restrained in simply “some way.”227
223. Supreme Court of the United States, The Court and Constitutional Interpretation,
https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/constitutional.aspx.
224. Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 629-30 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens argued, “the major
premise underpinning the majority’s entire analysis today—that the common law of arrest should
define the term “seizure” for Fourth Amendment purposes … is seriously flawed,” id. at 637.
225. Id. at 637.
226. Id. (emphasis in original).
227. Id.
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The Court, applying Terry in United States v. Mendenhall, noted that a
seizure occurred when, “in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the
incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to
leave.”228 Mendenhall declared, “[a]s long as the person to whom questions
are put remains free to disregard the questions and walk away, there has been
no intrusion upon that person’s liberty or privacy as would require some
particularized and objective justification.”229 The Court, in Florida v.
Bostick, refined the seizure definition to account for those situations where a
person’s freedom to “walk away” is constrained by circumstances other than
police action, such as when officers approach a person already seated on a
bus.230 When the Terry/Mendenhall “free to leave” analysis is inapplicable,
Bostick deemed the appropriate inquiry was “whether a reasonable person
would feel free to decline the officers’ requests or otherwise terminate the
encounter.”231 “Free to decline” appears as broad as freedom to “disregard.”
Bostick, however, offered even broader language for determining a seizure:
when officers “communicated to a reasonable person that he was not at
liberty to ignore the police presence and go about his business.”232 Since it
is a rare situation when a person feels that he or she can simply ignore an
officer who is attempting to make contact, this definition should cover much
police behavior indeed.
A return to the earlier “free to disregard the questions and walk away”
seizure definition, if fully honored, would offer a series of benefits. First,
faithfully applying this precedent would genuinely fulfill the Fourth
Amendment’s purpose of preserving “the right to be let alone—the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.”233 If
the Court today truly found a seizure whenever a reasonable person in the
citizen’s shoes felt unable to walk away or even to disregard questions an
officer put to the person, Fourth Amendment reasonableness would become
a part of many more police citizen contacts. Further, this rule would simplify
Fourth Amendment seizure issues by removing the common law distinction
between seizures by force and seizures by asserted authority. While
Mendenhall noted that a person could be seized by either “means of physical
force or a show of authority,” it did not offer a separate definition for these
two methods of restraining liberty.234 The notion, started in Hodari D. and
deepened in Torres, that “our prior cases contemplated a distinction between
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.

Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554.
Id.
Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 436 (1991).
Bostick, 501 U.S. at 436.
Id. at 437.
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 553.
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seizures effected by a touching on the one hand, and those effected by a show
of force on the other hand” is “nothing if not creative lawmaking” which
needlessly complicates Fourth Amendment analysis.235 Finally, the “free to
disregard the questions and walk away” seizure definition would properly
place the power back with the individual citizen because, unless a reasonable
person in the situation felt he or she could disregard the officer, Fourth
Amendment protection would limit official conduct.
The Terry stop and frisk is hardly without problems.236 Further, the
Court’s own extensions of official powers in the decades since Terry created
the stop and frisk have only exacerbated troubles.237 However, the
precipitous destruction of over fifty years of case law, based on expansive
language from a narrowly applied judicial philosophy, could have
profoundly disturbing consequences.

V.

Conclusion

Akhil Amar, in his book, The Bill of Rights: Creation and
Reconstruction, asked whether “many of us are guilty of a kind of curiously
selective ancestor worship—one that gives too much credit to James
Madison and not enough to John Bingham.”238 John Bingham was “the main

235. Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 642 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
236. The full extent of Terry’s troubles is an issue beyond the scope of this Article. However,
several genuine concerns have been identified. A disproportionate number of those subjected to
Terry stops have been people of color, Paul J. Larkin, Flight, Race, and Terrys Stops:
Commonwealth v. Warren, 16 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 163, 190 (2018). Moreover, as Wayne R.
LaFave, has noted, “police are on the watch for ‘suspicious’ travelers, and when a modicum of
supposedly suspicious circumstances are observed—or, perhaps, even on a hunch or pursuant to
such arbitrary considerations as the color of the driver’s skin—it is only a matter of time before
some technical or trivial offense produces the necessary excuse for a traffic stop,” Wayne R.
LaFave, The “Routine Traffic Stop” from Start to Finish: Too Much “Routine,” Not Enough Fourth
Amendment, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1843, 1844-45 (2004). Many of these traffic stops, based on
reasonable suspicion, are Terry stops, id. at 1848. Further, “[n]early five decades after the Supreme
Court’s decision in Terry v. Ohio, courts find it difficult to explain what level of detail constitutes
reasonable suspicion to stop a potential suspect following a completed crime,” Aliza Hochman
Bloom, When Too Many People Can Be Stopped: The Erosion of Reasonable Suspicion Required
for a Terry Stop, 9 ALABAMA C.R. & C. L. L. REV. 257, 258 (2018).
237. I have addressed the Court’s improper expansion of officers’ powers in performing Terry
stops in other articles, including, George M. Dery III, Allowing “Lawless Police Conduct” in Order
to Forbid “Lawless Civilian Conduct”: The Court Further Erodes the Exclusionary Rule in Utah
v. Strieff, 44 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 393 (2017); George M. Dery III and Jacklyn R. Vasquez,
Why Should an “Innocent Citizen” Shoulder the Burden of an Officer’s Mistake of Law? Heien v.
North Carolina Tells Police to Detain First and Learn the Law Later, 20 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L.
301 (2015); George M. Dery III and Kevin Meehan, The Devil is in the Details: The Supreme Court
Erodes the Fourth Amendment in Applying Reasonable Suspicion in Navarette v. California, 21
WASH. & LEE J. C. R. & SOC. JUST. 275 (2015).
238. AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION, 293 (Yale
University Press, 1998).
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author of Section I” of the Fourteenth Amendment.239 The Court eventually
interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause as
incorporating most of the protections in the Bill of Rights, including the
rights and remedies of the Fourth Amendment, to limit abuse by officials in
the states.240 The fact that John Bingham needs to be identified as a drafter
of the Fourteenth Amendment while James Madison is generally known as
the father of our Constitution neatly illustrates Amar’s point.241 Amar argued
that, in our telling of the “stock stories” about the Bill of Rights, we have
“exaggerated the Creation and diminished the Reconstruction;” we have
focused on the Bill of Rights when they were first ratified without
appreciating the changes these rights underwent in the wake of the Civil
War.242 The lesson here is crucial. While there is no gainsaying that the
intentions of the Founders provide invaluable insight into Fourth
Amendment rights, such evidence cannot be viewed in a vacuum sealed shut
in 1605.243 Instead, true fealty to the Fourth Amendment right against
unreasonable seizure of the person requires recognition of the profound
changes that have occurred since the “1789 Bill of Rights.”244
The common law of England, rather than trapping the Court in
squabbles over competing interpretations about the touch of a mace,245
should be providing guidance on the larger purpose of the Fourth
Amendment. The fundamental point of the Fourth Amendment is to protect
the right “to be let alone,” the “right to one’s person.”246 The Court has long
recognized that, “[n]o right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded
by the common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and
control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others,
unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law.”247 Terry, sensitive to
the “difficult and troublesome issues”248 implicated by seizures, and wary of

239. Id. at 171.
240. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
241. Encyclopedia Britannica, “The father of the Constitution, James Madison,”
https://www.britannica.com/biography/James-Madison/The-father-of-the-Constitution.
242. AMAR, supra note 238, at 293. Amar contended that, “in the very process of being
absorbed into the Fourteenth Amendment, various rights and freedoms of the original Bill may be
subtly but importantly transformed,” id. at 223. Amar suggested that Fourth Amendment
unreasonableness, when incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment, was informed by its
proximity to the Equal Protection Clause, id. at 268.
243. Torres, 141 S. Ct. at 997 (citing Countess of Rutland’s Case, 6 Co. Rep. 52b, 77 Eng. Rep.
332 (Star Chamber 1605)).
244. AMAR, supra note 238, at 3.
245. Id. at 997, 1013.
246. Union Pac. R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
247. Id.
248. Terry, 392 U.S. at 9.
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“rigid and unthinking application” of rules,249 appreciated the fundamental
Fourth Amendment value of security over one’s body.250 The Court in
Torres, seeking the timeless purity of an arrest at common law, missed the
Fourth Amendment’s larger meaning.

249. Id. at 15.
250. Id. at 9.
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